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Historical Social Research, Supplement — 2007 — No. 19, 93-105  
Constructivist Grounded Theory? 
Barney G. Glaser ∗ 
Abstract: I refer to and use as scholarly inspiration  
CHARMAZ’s excellent article on constructivist grounded 
theory as a tool of getting to the fundamental issues on why 
grounded theory is not constructivist. I show that construc-
tivist data, if it exists at all, is a very very small part of the 
data that grounded theory uses. 
 
Constructivist Grounded Theory (GT) is a misnomer. GT can use any data; it 
remains to be figured out what it is. In my book “The Grounded Theory Per-
spective” (GLASER 2001) I wrote a chapter (11) that dealt with “all is data.” I 
said:  
“All is data” is a well known Glaser dictum. What does it mean? It means ex-
actly what is going on in the research scene is the data, whatever the source, 
whether interview, observations, documents, in whatever combination. It is 
not only what is being told, how it is being told and the conditions of its being 
told, but also all the data surrounding what is being told. It means what is go-
ing on must be figured out exactly what it is is to be used for, that is conceptu-
alization, not for accurate description. Data is always as good as far as it goes, 
and there is always more data to keep correcting the categories with more 
relevant properties. (p.145)  
“All is Data” is a GT statement, NOT applicable to Qualitative Data Analy-
sis (QDA) and its worrisome accuracy abiding concern. Data is discovered for 
conceptualization to be what it is – theory. The data is what it is and the re-
searcher collects, codes and analyzes exactly what he has whether baseline 
data, properline1 data or objective data or misinterpreted data. It is what the 
researcher is receiving, as a pattern, and as a human being (which is inescap-
able). It just depends on the research.  
Remember again, the product will be transcending abstraction, NOT accu-
rate description. The product, a GT, will be an abstraction from time, place and 
                                                             
∗  Address all communications to: Barney G. Glaser, POB 400, Mill Valley, Ca 94942, USA;  
e-mail: bglaser@speakeasy.net. 
 First published in: FQS – Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung / Forum: Qualitative Social 
Research [On-line Journal], 6(2), 3(3). <http://www.qualitative-research.net/fqs-texte/3-
02/3-02glaser-e.htm>. Reprint with the friendly permission of the author and FQS. 
1  See GLASER (1998a, p.9) 
 94
people that frees the researcher from the tyranny of normal distortion by hu-
mans trying to get an accurate description to solve the worrisome accuracy 
problem. Abstraction frees the researcher from data worry and data doubts, and 
puts the focus on concepts that fit and are relevant.  
One major worry in QDA research, which does – but should not – effect 
GT, is a different take on the personal predilections of interviewer and inter-
viewee. According to QDA interview data yields the construction of data that 
represents the mutual interpretation of the interviewer and of the interviewee as 
the interview proceeds. This constructivist orientation is that data is constructed 
with interacting interpretations.  
This orientation, as written, never seems to see it as a characteristic of the 
type of interviewing. It probably applies to lengthy, in-depth interviews where 
mutuality can grow based on forcing type interview guides (see CHARMAZ 
2000). But this type of interviewing is a small piece of GT interviewing, al-
though it happens and one can do GT from it. Much GT interviewing is a very 
passive listening and then later during theoretical sampling focused questions 
to other participants during site spreading2 and based on emergent categories. It 
is hard for mutual constructed interpretations to characterize this data even 
though the data may be interpretive: for example psychotherapists telling the 
interviewer how to see a psychiatric facility or a supervisor telling how to 
understand his foremen.  
GT is a perspective based methodology and people’s perspectives vary. And 
as we showed in “Awareness of Dying” (GLASER & STRAUSS 1965) par-
ticipants have multiple perspectives that are varyingly fateful to their action. 
Multiple perspectives among participants is often the case and then the GT 
researcher comes along and raises these perspectives to the abstract level of 
conceptualization hoping to see the underlying or latent pattern, another per-
spective. This becomes complex, which core variable analysis organizes to 
reduce the confusion to an integrated complexity. Further complexifying the 
data is the type of data the GT researcher is obtaining – baseline, properline 
(confirm usage), interpretive, vague – and its varying sources.  
Thus it is just too, too simple a statement when Kathy CHARMAZ (2000, 
p.510) says:  
I add … another vision for future qualitative research: constructivist grounded 
theory. Constructivist grounded theory celebrates first hand knowledge of em-
pirical worlds, takes a middle ground between postmodernism and positivism, 
and offers accessible methods for taking qualitative research into the 21st cen-
tury. Constructivism assumes the relativism of multiple social realities, recog-
nizes the mutual creation of knowledge by the viewer and the viewed, and 
aims toward interpretive understanding of subjects’ meanings.  
If this is the way the data come down, then fine, BUT it is a bare small piece 
of the GT research action and it does not help “doing” for those doing the re-
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search. It just remains to be clear about the data that obtains and that is what-
ever it is. She is trying to solve the worrisome accuracy problem of QDA by 
trying to ascertain the data emerging in the deep, long (hour or so) interview 
situation. This kind of interviewing is characteristic of her “pet” substantive 
areas requiring depth, again a small piece of the GT action. Her quest is not to 
take the data as it comes, but to be sure it is accurate, so she gets to mutual 
interpretation as the answer. When I say that some data is interpreted, I mean 
the participant not only tells what is going on, but tells the researcher how to 
view it correctly – his/her way. I do not mean that they are mutually built up 
interpretations. Adding his of her interpretations would be an unwarranted 
intrusion of the researcher.  
The constant comparative method discovers the latent pattern in the multiple 
participant’s words, such as, for example, pain leveling provided by dental 
clinics undermines repair work. Her miss in that the GT focus is on conceptu-
alization of latent patterns, and GT is about a concept, e.g. cautionary control, 
and not about the accuracy of story talk. In fact, in a recent study of “talk 
story,” by Bay JONES (2002), how the stories were built was irrelevant. They 
were efforts at sharing, mutual affirmations and support and camaraderie to 
reduce the bewilderment of the lonely ongoing world and to exert shared con-
trol by perspective over it. The competitive parlance was a one-upmanship 
control to preempt the descriptive scene that all could share. Thus CHARMAZ 
talks the talk of conceptualization, but actually walks the talk of descriptive 
capture. Accordingly GT is remodeled to a QDA method from its origination of 
conceptual core variable analysis of “whatever” data is involved – baseline, 
properline (confirm usage), interpreted or vague. Her understanding of abstrac-
tions involved in theoretical coding, substantive coding, delimiting, theoretical 
sampling etc, etc, are missed, neglected or quashed in favor of QDA methods 
and descriptive capture3.  
So we can see that constructivism – joint build of an interactive, interpreted, 
produced data – is an epistemological bias to achieve a credible, accurate de-
scription of data collection – sometimes. But it depends on the data. If the data 
is garnered through an interview guide that forces and feeds interviewee re-
sponses then it is constructed to a degree by interviewer imposed interactive 
bias. But, as I said above, with the passive, non structured interviewing or 
listening of the GT interview-observation method, constructivism is held to a 
minimum.  
It appears that constructivism is an effort to dignify the data and to avoid the 
work of confronting researcher bias. Remember bias is just another variable 
and a social product. If the researcher is exerting bias, then this is a part of the 
research, in which bias is a vital variable to weave into the constant compara-
tive analysis. It happens easily in “hot” or “passionate position” issue oriented 
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research, such as political, feminism, or abuse type research or in research on 
inviolate control structures, which cannot tolerate implicit subversion. This 
aspect of default remodeling, that is covering bias up for what it is – another 
variable – is a vital loss to GT.  
CHARMAZ (2000, p.522) comes close to what I am saying but descriptive 
capture of QDA subverts it. She says: “Like wondrous gifts waiting to be 
opened, early grounded theory tests imply that categories and concepts inhere 
within the data, awaiting the researcher’s discovery … Not so.” This statement 
is unbelievably wrong. Categories, which are concepts, are not wondrous gifts, 
they come from the tedium of the constant comparative method linked with 
sensitive theoretical sampling and are constantly fitted to the data.  
Compounding this wrong thinking, CHARMAZ continues:  
Glaser (1978, 1992) assumes that we can gather our data unfettered by bias or 
biography. Instead, a constructivist approach recognizes that the categories, 
concepts and theoretical level of an analysis emerge from the researcher’s in-
teractions within the field and questions about the data.  
As I have said, to the degree a researcher’s personal predilection biases the 
data, it is a variable to consider, for example “she thinks that way because she 
is a feminist.” But as I have also said, the constant comparative process reveals 
these biases. And I am also quite gratified to see that most researchers, I have 
worked with, take great pains to not intrude there own views in the data. In 
addition, the abstractions that emerge become independent of the researcher 
bias that CHARMAZ worries about. For example credentializing, cultivating, 
spiritual power abusing or pseudo-friending just go on, no matter the bias take 
on them that may emerge. For example when a researcher hears “I do not need 
a degree or certificate, I know it all anyway,” this structurally impossible bias 
does not do away with the general process of training. And furthermore, GT is 
about concepts not accurate descriptions as CHARMAZ worries about. De-
scriptive capture remodels GT. Continuing her descriptive capture,  
CHARMAZ (2000) says, yet again:  
The grounded theorist’s analysis tells a story about people, social processes, 
and situations. The researcher composes the story; it does not simply unfold 
before the eyes of an objective viewer. The story reflects the viewer as well as 
the viewed.  
Again, absolutely NO, the GT researcher does not “compose” the “story.” 
GT is not description, and the unfolding is emergent from the careful tedium of 
the constant comparative method and theoretical sampling – fundamental GT 
procedures. These are not story making, they are generating a theory by careful 
application of all the GT procedures. The human biasing whatever is mini-
mized to the point of irrelevancy in what I have seen in hundreds of studies. 
The GT reflections of the researcher are his/her skill at doing GT. This remod-
eling by CHARMAZ of GT is clearly just not correct and is implicitly support-
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ing the QDA requirements for accuracy. CHARMAZ has not considered the 
properties of conceptualization in her offer of a constructivist GT.  
CHARMAZ asserts that the abstract terms and dense writing GLASER 
(1978) employed in “Theoretical Sensitivity” rendered the book inaccessible to 
many readers. This statement is just not true. “Theoretical Sensitivity” has sold 
over 3,000 copies. It is used in many many dissertations and letters to me laud-
ing it are legion. CHARMAZ’s assertion legitimizes the default remodeling of 
GT down to some conceptual description. It appears that most of her under-
graduate students cannot or hardly can conceptualize, so most do QDA. This is 
very real, but no reason to remodel GT.  
CHARMAZ constantly pursues, over and over in her article, this construc-
tionist tack on QDA while using it to remodel GT. She compounds her error by 
saying, irrespective of their differences:  
Both Glaser and Strauss … assume an external reality that researchers can 
discover and record … Glaser and Strauss (1967) imply that reality is inde-
pendent of the observer and the methods used to produce it. Because both 
Glaser and Strauss … follow the canons of objective reportage, both ... write 
about their data as distanced experts …, thereby contributing to an objective 
stance. (CHARMAZ 2000, p.513)  
I said compounding her error because she neglects the carefulness of the GT 
method which makes the generated theory as objective as humanly possible. 
BUT also she neglects that the product is conceptual which provides an abstract 
distance from the data. Thus the conceptualizations are distant, objectifications 
if she wishes to use these terms. But more to the point, she is caught by de-
scriptive capture and is remodeling GT to QDA story talk, while neglecting the 
fundamental properties of abstraction analysis.  
Using constructivism as a justification in reverse CHARMAZ engages in a 
recidivism which makes the researcher’s interactive impact on the data more 
important than the participants. Constructionism is used to legitimate forcing. It 
is like saying that if the researcher is going to be part of constructing the data, 
then he/she may as well construct it his way. Again the properties of abstrac-
tion are ignored and GT is remodeled. Listen to what CHARMAZ says:  
Glaser assumes that data become transparent, that we researchers will see the 
basic social process in the field through respondents’ telling us what is signifi-
cant. However, what researchers see may be neither basic nor certain 
(Mitchell and Charmaz 1996). What respondents assume or do not apprehend 
may be much more important than what they talk about. An acontextual reli-
ance on respondents’ overt concerns can lead to narrow research problems, 
limited data and trivial analyses. (CHARMAZ 2000, p.514)  
This statement is so untrue and so descriptive captured. She uses construc-
tivism to discount the participant’s main concern, which is always relevant to 
ongoing resolving behavior, in favor of the researcher’s professional concern, 
which is most often irrelevant to behavior in the substantive area (see GLASER 
1998a, Chapter 8, pp.115-132). I have seen this over and over in research. Then 
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her descriptive capture leads her to totally ignore that the researcher by con-
stant comparisons conceptualizes the latent pattern – core category – in the 
resolving of the main concern, which conceptualization the participants may 
not be aware of since it conceptualizes their incidents. So an incident which 
may have appeared trivial can actually be a vital indicator of the core category 
that resolves the main concern.  
CHARMAZ is also unaware that the conceptualization of the core category 
based on incidents has a generality that may easily inform and be related to the 
professional problem. Thus Amy CALVIN, in her dissertation (2000), got 
nowhere trying to study end of life directives, particularly organ donations. 
When she listened to the participants she discovered a theory of personal pres-
ervation under a condition of a deteriorating physical life – an irreversible 
illness. This bore heavily on the professional problem and explained why organ 
donations were not forthcoming and suggested avenues of potential resolutions 
to this problem. As I have said in “Doing Grounded Theory” (GLASER 
1998a), only people who can conceptualize should do GT. CHARMAZ contin-
ues:  
Most grounded theorists write as if their data have an objective status ... ‘The 
data do not lie.’ ... [But d]ata are narrative constructions. ... They are recon-
structions of experience; they are not the original experience itself. ... Whether 
our respondents ply us with data in interview accounts they recast for our con-
sumption or we record ethnographic stories to reflect experience as best we 
can recall and narrate, data remain reconstructions. (2000, p.514, my empha-
sis, B.G.)  
Let us be clear, researchers are human beings and therefore must to some 
degree reify data in trying to symbolize it in collecting, reporting and coding 
the data. In doing so they may impart their personal bias and/or interpretations 
– ergo this is called constructivist data. But this data is rendered objective to a 
high degree by most research methods and GT in particular by looking at many 
cases of the same phenomenon, when jointly collecting and coding data, to 
correct for bias and to make the data objective. This constant correction suc-
ceeds in both QDA methods and in GT’s methodology especially so because 
the corrections are conceptualized into categories and their properties, hence 
become abstract of researcher interpretations. The latent patterns – categories – 
hold as objective if the GT researcher carefully compares much data from 
many different participants. Personal input by a researcher soon drops out as 
eccentric and the data become objectivist not constructionist. Thus, for exam-
ple, no matter what are nurses responses to being required to go back to school 
to get a more advance degree, the latent pattern emerges is that they are being 
credentialized. And this substantive theory has much generality in explaining 
responses in any field, when its members are being forced, to go back to a 
school to get a license, certificate or credential. Credentialzing theory emerges 
as real, it is not constructed (see “Gerund Grounded Theory,” GLASER 1998b, 
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for many examples). Clearly CHARMAZ’s formulations are for QDA worri-
some accuracy problems, NOT for GT abstractions, unless, of course, she 
remodels GT to a QDA method.  
CHARMAZ cites several “critical challenges to grounded theory.” All the 
critiques she cites reflect descriptive capture and a QDA approach, thus are 
misapplied critiques regarding GT. GT is a conceptual method, not a descrip-
tive method, as we know. Thus descriptive critiques which are all about worri-
some accuracy do not apply to GT. She cites several authors who state that GT 
methods were insufficient to respect their interviewees and portray their stories. 
She says: Grounded theory “authors choose evidence selectively, clean up 
subjects’ statements, unconsciously adopt value-laden metaphors, assume 
omniscience and bore readers” (2000, p.521). GT authors are challenged with 
respect to “their authority to interpret subjects’ lives.” These criticisms imply 
that GT methods gloss over meanings with respondents stories. She continues:  
Grounded theory research might limit understanding because grounded theo-
rists aim for analysis rather that the portrayal of subjects experience in it full-
ness ... fracturing the data imply that grounded theory methods lead to separat-
ing the experience from the experiencing subject, the meaning from the story, 
and the viewer from the viewed. Grounded theory limits entry into the sub-
jects worlds and thus reduces understanding of their experience. 
These criticisms do not apply as they all remodel GT into a QDA method 
devoted to careful, full, voice and meaning description of the participant’s 
story, in short a QDA DESCRIPTION. This is exactly what GT is not – a QDA 
meaning, story description. GT is a theory about a conceptualized latent pattern 
– e.g. cultivating, credentializing, covering, client control, ritual loss ceremo-
nies etc. Criticizing it for not doing what it does not purport to do, is an au-
thors’ error on CHARMAZ’s part. It is in essence a default remodeling of GT 
to a poor QDA method, and thus a block on good GT research to achieve a 
conceptual theory: such as a theory on desisting residual selves. CHARMAZ’s 
error is compounded by her concluding from her misapplication:  
A constructivist grounded theory assumes that people create and maintain 
meaningful worlds though dialectic processes of conferring meaning on their 
realities and acting within them ... By adopting a constructivist grounded the-
ory approach, the researcher can move grounded theory methods further into 
the realm of interpretation social science ... [with] emphasis on meaning, 
without assuming the existence of a unidimensional external reality. A con-
structivist grounded theory recognizes the interactive nature of both data col-
lection and analysis, resolves recent criticisms of the method, and reconciles 
positivist assumptions and postmodernist critiques. Moreover, a constructivist 
grounded theory fosters the development of qualitative traditions through 
study of experience from the standpoint of those who live it. (pp.521-522)  
This is a mighty order for constructivist GT however highly relevant to 
QDA. BUT it is totally irrelevant to GT as actually originated for generating a 
conceptual theory about say, a basic social process or a fundamental cutting 
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point (e.g. marriage ceremony), that is about a concept. CHARMAZ remodels 
GT when she is actually proffering a constructivist approach to QDA methods. 
The strength of QDA research has clouded and swayed her view of GT, and 
thus she denies and blocks its true conceptual nature.  
Her paper is filled with statements like the following: “Thus the grounded 
theorist constructs an image of a reality, not the reality – that is, objective, true, 
and external” (p.523). This is clearly a descriptive goal – a try to get accuracy 
directly through interactive construction. It is not the conceptual goal of GT, 
nor does is deal with researcher impact as another variable. Her formulation 
actually takes away the participants reality by saying it is recast in some way 
by the researcher. So the participant’s voice is not heard, but distorted or lost. 
Enough, I will let the QDA methodologists defend themselves against her view 
of real accuracy. GT should not be swallowed up, hence remodeled, by these 
notions of accuracy, which are not relevant to its conceptual abstracting goal.  
These QDA methodologists are sincere and ever reaching for their elusive 
goal of worrisome accuracy – however they may currently term it. But in the 
bargain they have virtually destroyed all notions of accuracy, or posit a reality 
as truly nonexistent, but just a figment of the mind. CHARMAZ continues on 
this position about reality:  
we [the grounded theorists] must try to find what research participants define 
as real and where their definitions of reality take them. The constructivist ap-
proach also fosters our self consciousness about what we attribute to our sub-
jects and how, when, and why researcher portray these definitions as real. 
Thus the research products do not constitute the reality of the respondents’ re-
ality. Rather, each is a rendering, one interpretation among multiple interpreta-
tions, of a shared or individual reality ... we change our conception of it [so-
cial life] from a real world to be discovered, tracked, and categorized to a 
world made real in the minds and through the words and actions of it mem-
bers (p.523).  
I have critiqued this QDA accuracy approach already. It neglects the con-
stant comparative method applied to large numbers of participants to discover 
what categories latently pattern out. It neglects GT’s careful procedures. Con-
ceptual reality DOES EXIST. For example, client control is real; cautionary 
control is real; social structural covering is real. These processes and a myriad 
of others discovered in GT research, impinge on us every day. Just go to the 
doctor, drive a car or go into surgery and/or take on the Catholic Church and 
the reader will see the reality of these researches and apply the conceptually, 
generated theory. CHARMAZ’ position on constructivism is itself a reality for 
QDA methodologist to deal with, if after discounting it that they actually care.  
Her constructivist position is totally irrelevant to GT methodology, EX-
CEPT as it is allowed to remodel GT methodology by default. Do not let it. She 
does remodel GT by repeating over and over in many paraphrasing ways her 
new found truth. She says adamantly:  
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A constructivist grounded theory recognizes that the viewer creates the data 
and ensuing analysis through interaction with the viewed. Data do not provide 
a window on reality. Rather, the ‘discovered’ reality arises from the interac-
tive process and its temporal, cultural, and structural contexts. Researcher and 
subjects frame that interaction and confer meaning upon it. The viewer then is 
part of what is viewed rather than separate from it. (pp.523-524)  
She justifies this position by a rhetorical correction which asserts several 
ways, over and over, that constructivist corrects the objectivist, positivist lean-
ing of most GT studies. Actually it only remodels the GT position; it corrects 
nothing that needs correcting.  
CHARMAZ sees emergence as interactive not objective. But for GT what is 
emerging just depends on the type of data, how much of it, how many partici-
pants, etc., etc. to see if researcher impact is generating a bias in its conceptu-
alization. For example, to use her example, medical dominance is a real cate-
gory no matter what the variations in experience of either participant or 
researchers and how it is shared interactively. Indeed, in GT the researcher’s 
experience itself may just be more data for doing a GT of medical dominance. I 
often counsel researchers with similar experience as their respondents to do 
field notes on themselves as just more data to constantly compare. This pre-
vents their forcing the read on the data as if it comes from the respondent. The 
researcher just provides more incidents in this case as another participant. 
When researchers study their life cycle interest (see GLASER 1978), this can 
happen frequently. For example, when nurses study a problem on a type ward 
they have worked on for years, they will compare notes of themselves, not 
impose their experience on the interview or data.  
CHARMAZ’s constructivist position has a structurally specific source: in-
depth interviews with patients having chronic illness, which interviews are 
based on a developed, over time relationship in which “private thoughts and 
feelings” can be expressed and their meanings probed. There is a “subjective, 
immersion” of the researcher in their illness, hence tending to produce descrip-
tion for intense interaction, in contrast to producing an abstraction or conceptu-
alization of it, which feels distantiated or in her words “external.” Her kind of 
data, which is an almost therapeutic stance, is very infrequent in GT research. 
Hence her constructivist data, if it exists at all, is a very, very small source of 
GT research.  
CHARMAZ tries to bolster her GT remodeling position by invective against 
GT as originated. She says: “[O]bjectivist grounded theory methods foster 
externality by invoking procedures that increase complexity at the expense of 
experience ... Objectivist grounded theory especially risks cloaking analytic 
power in jargon” (p.525). She further continues that she is into depth feelings 
of subjective experience. I would hope that GT in conceptualizing a theory of 
how participants resolve their main concern (e.g. handling cautionary control 
requirements) does not generate a mere jargon. Though as I said in “Grounded 
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Theory Perspective” (GLASER 2001) GT concepts have such grab that they 
can become jargonized in the hands of someone who uses them in theory bits.  
CHARMAZ does not have these variables in her armamentarium of argu-
ments. Also research on social life and social psychology is not an effort to do 
in-depth psychology. We have a level phenomenon here in comparing fields of 
inquiry, which she does not differentiate and may confuse. She says: “a 
contructivist grounded theory may remain at a more intuitive, impressionistic 
level than an objectivist approach” (p.526). It sounds also like it remodels GT 
procedures, since patterns in pure GT are carefully grounded by constant com-
parison. They are not intuitive impressionistic generations as I said in “Doing 
Grounded Theory” (GLASER 1998a). However intuitive, the pattern must 
pattern out by the tedium of constant comparison.  
In combating objectivist vs. constructionist CHARMAZ has clearly remod-
eled GT from a conceptual theory to a QDA conceptual description method 
with worrisome accuracy at issue. Her descriptive capture focuses getting the 
participant’s story descriptively straight so it can be told accurately, with 
minimal researcher distortion. She says:  
In short, constructing constructivism means seeking meanings – both respon-
dent’s meanings and researcher’s meanings. To seek respondent’s meanings, 
we must go further than surface meanings or presumed meanings ... A con-
structivist approach necessitates a relationship with respondents in which they 
can cast their stories in their terms. (p.525) 
I sacrificed immediacy for accuracy by writing about respondents in the past 
because the events described took place in the past. ... [In] Good Days, Bad 
Days (Charmaz 1991) ... I took the reader through messy houses, jumbled 
schedules, pressures to simplify life, fragile pacing, and enormous effort to 
function to the relief when relief occurs. This detail gave readers imagery on 
which to build ... Written images portray the tone the writer takes toward the 
topic and reflects the writer’s relationships with his or her respondents ... I try 
to portray respondents’ worlds and views ... I remain in the background as a 
story-teller whose tales have believable characters. (pp.527-528)  
It is clear in these quotes that talk story is CHARMAZ’s goal and getting the 
story accurate takes an in-depth longitudinal relationship. This is a clear re-
model of GT as originated to a descriptive QDA method, at best conceptual 
description, under the guise of calling it constructivist GT. Her discussion has 
none of the properties of conceptual theory generation of pure GT. It is all 
accurate description (imagery), not abstraction. For example, would it not be 
delightful to read a good GT on simplifying lifestyles under a condition of 
impairing chronic illness. Instead we read endless descriptions on simplifying 
life with no latent pattern conceptualization to explain how simplifying con-
tinually resolves the pressure to redesign life – as we said in our book “Chronic 
Illness and the Quality of Life” (STRAUSS & GLASER 1975). In her zeal to 
be a “story teller” CHARMAZ gives but a nod to pure GT by some conceptual 
description and then claims a move toward the constructivist approach is “con-
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sistent with grounded theory.” This move is not consistent with GT, it is just a 
remodel erosion of pure GT. The reader, of course, can follow her vision.  
My sole purpose here is to show the default remodeling that GT is subjected 
to, so the reader will have no illusion about what CHARMAZ is doing and 
what GT really is. The difference is choice of method: it is different than, not 
better than. CHARMAZ (p.528) acknowledges this when she says: “the future 
of grounded theory lies with both objectivist and constructivist visions.” But 
she is misled in thinking that the constructivist vision is in fact GT. It is just 
another QDA method in pursuit of accuracy.  
This text, yet again, illustrates how descriptive capture overwhelms GT in 
many researchers professing themselves as a grounded theorist. Descriptive 
procedures divorce data analysis from GT conceptualizing procedures, as if the 
descriptive procedures are GT and they are not. Describing what is going on, 
does not explain conceptually what is going on as a fundamental pattern of 
process, typology, cutting point, binary etc.  
Yet as I said in “GT Perspective” description runs the world and looking be-
yond this to conceptualizing latent patterns as categories and their properties is 
hard. It is easier to worry about accuracy of description – a traditional science 
concern – by concluding a constructivist orientation, using constructivism 
rather than using an orientation of conceptual modifications of a GT based on 
biased variables emerging from abstracting “all is data” whether the data is 
vague, baseline, properline, and/or interpreted. Yet GT conceptualization is 
much more powerful in application and in just knowing how to explain. 
Constructivism is a backdoor approach to studying the professional problem 
in lieu of studying the main concern of the participants. Why?, because the 
participants echoing each other on their main concern is a product of researcher 
interpretation and thus diluted, so we lose this relevance to the research. This is 
a clear remodeling of a vital property of GT which provides the core category.  
Thus we have CHARMAZ (pp.528-529) saying: “Although I pondered over 
organizing the book [Good Days, Bad Days, CHARMAZ 1991] around one 
process, I could not identify an overarching theme.” This is the consequence of 
the constructivist forcing interpretations of the researcher thereby losing the 
core variable relevance which continually resolves the main concern. QDA 
descriptions have no core relevance because of full coverage. Whereas GT 
researchers listen to participants and hear their main concern resolving organ-




My repetitive arguments in this contribution preclude a summary which would 
actually be redundant. The constructivist block on pure GT is clear. A very 
small aspect of GT data collection is NOT the whole GT enterprise.  
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Epilogue 
Constructivism orientation has taken quite a hold in the QDA method world. 
My only argument is not to let it remodel GT in manifest and subtle ways. The 
grab of this orientation is indicated by the following e-mail request for an arti-
cle by Katja MRUCK, editor, FQS, which I received on Oct 23 2001. Notice 
the non-questioning, “as if” assumption of the constructivist authenticity and 
accuracy. 
 
Dear Barney,  
I would like to invite you to consider writing an article for the forthcoming 
FQS issue ‘Subjectivity and Reflexivity in Qualitative Research.’ The issue 
will be published in Sept 2002, and will deal – among others with the follow-
ing topics: the constructive character of research in the (social) sciences and 
subjectivity as a determinant of the qualitative research process, and epistemo-
logical subjectivity, using self reflexivity as an important tool to access and to 
develop scientific knowledge. 
Research – the process and its products – depends on the characteristic of the 
persons involved, on their biological, mental social, cultural and historical etc. 
make up and/or condition. In this issue, we would like authors to de-
scribe/analyze/discuses this fundamental subjectivity of any – and also of sci-
entific – knowledge (a) from different scientific and disciplinary contexts; (b) 
during different stages of the research process; (c) according to different types 
of knowledge as outcomes of the researcher’s efforts, etc. 
We presuppose that research is inherently structured by the subjectivity of the 
researcher (my emphasis, B.G.). We therefore do not want authors to limit 
themselves by characterizing subjectivity in defensive ways as an epistemo-
logical ‘deficiency,’ accompanied by methodological efforts, to minimize/to 
eliminate possible ‘biases.’ Instead, we are asking for possible ways to face 
the epistemological and methodological challenges in a proactive way that 
takes in account this core characteristic of any form of knowledge. What are 
the methodological, pragmatic and research/writing strategies that result from 




Katja has obviously taken the larger QDA view of constructionism. But she 
does not realize from a GT point of view that researcher impact on data is just 
one more variable to consider whenever it emerges as relevant. It is like all GT 
categories and properties; it must earn its relevance. Thus it depends. And so 
much data are used in GT research to generate categories (latent patterns), that 
categories are generated by constant comparison of many, many interviews that 
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